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Lebanon:	The	Refugee	Issue	and	the	Threat	of	a	Sectarian	Confrontation		
Daniel	Meier		CNRS	–	PACTE	UMR	5193	–	Grenoble					
Abstract	
This	 article	 highlights	 the	 many	 dimensions	 of	 the	 threat	 that	 exists	 nowadays	 in	 Lebanon	
regarding	the	impact	of	the	Syrian	uprising	turning	into	a	civil	war.	To	do	so,	I	will	firstly	focus	
on	the	 issue	of	Syrian	refugee	 in	Lebanon.	Recalling	the	Syrian-Lebanese	complex	relationship,	
the	article	delves	in	the	collective	memory	of	the	Palestinian	issue	in	Lebanon	that	pops	up	again	
as	thousands	of	them	are	 fleeing	Syria	to	seek	refuge	 in	Palestinian	camps.	 In	the	second	part,	
the	 article	 addresses	 the	 related	 question	 of	 Sunnis/Shiites	 tensions	 that	 have	 become	 a	
significant	 factor	 in	 the	 Syrian	 civil	war	and	 that	 have	been	 imported	 into	Lebanon	by	major	
political	parties	and	entrepreneurs	of	violence.		
Keywords	Syrian	 Refugees,	 Palestinians	 Refugees,	 Sectarian	 Tension,	 Hizb	 Allāh,	 al-Mustaqbal,	Entrepreneurship	of	Violence.		
Acknowledgement	The	 author	 would	 like	 to	 thank	 two	 anonymous	 reviewers	 for	 their	 comments	 and	suggestions	and	the	Center	for	Lebanese	Studies	in	Oxford	as	well	as	the	CEMAM	at	St	Joseph	University	in	Beirut	for	their	support.		The	refugee	problem	the	Syrian	uprising	created	has	profound	implications	for	Lebanon	for,	historical	as	well	as	political	reasons.	This	 impact	 is	at	 least	twofold:	 first	 in	the	daily	 life	of	Lebanese	 citizens	 and	 institutions	 and	 second	 in	 their	 representations	 of	 the	 “other”,	 the	Syrian	 or	 the	 Palestinian	 refugee	 arriving	 from	 Syria.1	With	 at	 least	 one	million	 of	 Syrians	actually	residing	in	Lebanon,	the	country	has	reached	a	saturation	level,	as	many	acknowledge	it	(ICG,	2013).	It	also	deepened	the	tension	between	Sunnis	and	Shiites.	In	this	view,	the	two	major	 Lebanese	 political	 parties	 of	 the	 two	 main	 Muslim	 sects,	 The	 Future	 Current	 (al-Mustaqbal)	for	the	Sunnis	and	the	God’s	Party	(Hizb	Allāh)	for	the	Shiites	have	a	leading	role	in	importing	the	sectarian	rifts	the	current	conflict	in	Syria	generated.		 This	paper	aims	at	analyzing	the	vectors	of	the	importation	of	the	Syrian	conflict	into	Lebanon.	In	my	views,	a	first	vector	of	this	process	refers	to	the	perception	and	relationship	the	Lebanese	institutions	and	actors	have	of	their	Syrian	and	Palestinian	neighbours.	I	will	try	to	discuss	 these	aspects	 thanks	 to	 the	notion	of	 “collective	memory”	 inspired	by	 the	French	sociologist	Maurice	Halbwachs.	A	second	vector	is	incarnate	by	the	game	played	by	the	most	powerful	 actors	of	 the	Lebanese	political	 scene	 that	 are	at	 stake	 in	 the	 repercussion	of	 this	crisis	in	Lebanon:	the	Sunni-led	group	of	Al-Mustaqbal	(The	Future	Current)	and	the	strongly	militarized	Shi’i-led	group	of	Hizb	Allāh.	Through	their	actions	and	discourses	they	both	bear	a	responsibility	in	the	emergence	of	groups	of	entrepreneurship	of	violence	on	their	fringes.		In	 the	 first	part	 I	will	discuss	 the	main	 issues	 related	 to	 the	massive	 influx	of	 Syrian	refugees	and	Palestinian	refugees	in	Lebanon	following	the	outbreak	of	the	civil	war	in	Syria	in	2011.	This	will	lead	me	to	recall	the	historic	roots	on	which	fears	can	be	raised	in	several																																																									1	See	the	paper	of	Estella	Carpi	in	this	special	issue.	
  
sectors	of	the	population	and	then	to	understand	the	policy	adopted	by	the	former	Mīqātī-led	government	until	its	resignation	in	late	March	2013.	The	second	part	will	deal	more	directly	with	 the	 behaviour	 adopted	 by	 the	 two	 antagonistic	 parties	 al-Mustaqbal	 and	 Hizb	 Allāh	towards	the	refugees	since	the	beginning	of	the	Syrian	uprising	in	March	2011	as	it	is	related	to	 their	 opposite	 posture	 towards	 the	 conflict	 in	 Syria.	 Finally,	 I	will	 argue	 that	 one	 of	 the	hidden	 vector	 of	 a	 possible	 extension	 of	 the	 crisis	 within	 Lebanon	 is	 represented	 by	 the	emergence	of	 two	 figure	of	entrepreneurship	of	violence	 that	are	 taking	profit	of	 insecurity	and	fear:	Šaykh	Asīr	on	the	one	hand	and	the	clan	of	the	Al-Miqdād	on	the	other	hand.		
1.	The	refugee	issue:	from	fear	to	State’s	policy		The	 refugee	 from	 Syria,	 gathering	 Syrian	 nationals	 as	 well	 as	 Palestinians	 from	 Syria,	 are	representing	nowadays	more	than	a	million	of	people	 in	Lebanon.	Their	massive	arrival	 the	last	 three	years	have	 illustrated	the	partial	reading	the	Lebanese	state	did	on	this	 issue	and	the	 lack	 of	 clear	 policy	 toward	 them.	 It	 is	 striking	 also	 to	 see	 how	 problematic	 the	relationships	 between	 Lebanese	 and	 Syrians	 vs.	 Palestinians	 are.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 state’s	policy	is	revealing	about	deep	fears	that	dated	back	from	the	civil	war	(1975-1990)	and	that	continue	to	shape	the	perception	of	the	two	national	groups	of	foreigners	that	are	now	living	as	refugees	in	Lebanon.	To	clarify	this	issue,	I	will	first	detail	the	nature	of	these	relationships	in	 the	collective	memories	of	 the	main	sectarian	group	 in	Lebanon.	Then	 I	will	examine	 the	State’s	policy	towards	the	Syrian	and	Palestinian	refugees	to	show	the	repercussion	of	these	perceptions	for	the	refugees’	life	in	Lebanon.		
1.1.	Fear	in	heritage		At	the	beginning	of	their	flight,	the	Syrian	refugees	sought	refuge	in	the	Sunni	villages	in	North	Lebanon,	‘Akkār	and	Tripoli.	If	they	were	initially	welcome,	the	massive	influx	that	occurred	in	2012	 and	 the	 increasing	 needs	 they	 had,	 transformed	 them	 into	 a	 burden	 for	 local	communities	first	and	for	the	State	that	had	to	deal	with	it.	Firstly,	their	hosts	expected	them	to	return	home	soon	and	secondly,	 the	 financial	capacity	of	each	 family	where	some	sought	with	 refuge	 was	 very	 limited.	 More	 generally,	 what	 is	 clearly	 visible	 is	 the	 economic	slowdown	that	affects	the	export	sector,	increasing	prices	for	number	of	basic	goods,	a	drop	of	80%	in	 tourism	revenues	and	a	20%	fall	 in	real	estate	sector	 investments.2	 In	such	context,	the	 attention	 and	 care	 provided	 to	 refugees	 by	 Lebanese	 NGO’s	 and	 international	organisations	 generates	 resentment	 towards	 Syrian	 refugees	 in	 an	 often	 overblown	perception	put	that	way:	“refugees	are	living	in	better	conditions	than	we	do”	(ICG,	2013:	9).	Such	reactions	are	also	resulting	from	previous	perceptions	of	who	the	Syrians	are	and	dates	back	 to	 the	 period	 of	 war	 (1975-1990)	 and	 occupation	 of	 Lebanon	 (1990-2005).	 A	 vivid	memory	of	humiliation,	killings	and	arbitrary	power	over	Lebanese	citizens	remains.3	Even	if	it	 is	clearly	identified	with	the	Asad	regime,	Syrians	are	also	seen	as	former	member	of	that	regime	approving	of	its	methods	and	its	policy	of	fear.	This	brings	us	to	the	troubled	and	tensed	relationship	between	Syria	and	Lebanon	(Meier	2013a).	This	aspect	 could	progressively	have	a	heavier	weight	 in	 the	mind-set	of	Lebanese,	the	 longer	 the	crisis	 lasts.	The	 fact	 is	 that	 such	perception	already	shaped	 the	reactions	 the	Lebanese	state	took	towards	the	Syrian	refugees.	In	the	following	line,	I	would	like	to	explore	this	mindset	 through	 the	notion	of	 “collective	memory”,	 following	 the	seminal	reflections	of																																																									2	According	to	several	sources,	the	initial	8%	GDP	growth	that	occurred	between	2007	and	2010	is	now	at	a	2%	level	for	2012.	See	the	paper	of	George	Corm	in	this	special	issue.	3	See	for	instance	Rougier	and	Picard	(2000),	Hanf	and	Salam	(2002),	Kassir	(2006)	and	Meier	(2007).	
  
Maurice	Halbwachs	(1994).	One	of	the	key	element	of	his	theoretical	thought	deals	with	how	we	do	remember.	He	explained	that	remembrance	is	a	collective	work:	we	remind	things	and	events	 through	 and	 with	 the	 others.	 The	 memory	 can	 be	 then	 understood	 as	 a	 form	 of	perceptions	socially	shared	(Picaudou,	2006).	To	articulate	such	conception	with	a	collective	experience,	one	need	to	 think	social	groups	as	a	symbolic	reality	 that	share	social	relations,	values	and	norms	and	thus	define	the	meaning	of	its	collective	experience	(Baussaut,	2010).	But,	Picaudou	(2006)	warns	that	such	definition	of	the	reality	can	change	in	time	and	so,	the	moment	when	things	are	said	and	thought	are	depending	on	circumstances	and	contexts	that	need	to	be	detailed.	At	present	day,	one	can	notice	a	political	alliance	between	the	Free	Syrian	Army	(FSA)	and	the	Future	Current	although	the	definition	of	each	of	those	groups	is	complex	and	changing.4	Providing	 an	 explanation	 of	 such	 alliance	 is	 possible	 through	 the	 relationship	 between	Lebanon	 and	 Syria.	 Since	 the	onset,	 they	were	 complex	because	France’s	mandate	over	 the	region	in	the	1920s	divided	Syria	to	rule	it	as	a	rebel	State	and	take	a	good	care	of	Lebanon,	a	separate	 State	 perceived	 by	 Arab	 nationalists	 as	 a	 colonial	 creation	 dividing	 a	 Great	 Arab	Kingdom	(Chaitani	2007).	The	favours	granted	to	the	Lebanese	Maronite	elite	compared	badly	to	the	poor	consideration	Syrian	elites	were	held	 into,	contributing	to	 increasing	frustration	and	 envy.	 At	 independence	 the	 two	 countries	 knew	 ups	 and	 downs	 based	 on	 economic	exchanges	as	Syria	constituted	for	Lebanon	–	until	nowadays	–	the	country’s	primary	outlet	and	 the	 main	 land	 access	 to	 other	 Arab	 countries	 for	 goods.	 Lebanon	 also	 represented	 a	country	that	Syrians	to	express	their	desire	for	freedom	and	a	space	for	Syria	to	“export”	its	manpower	which	in	turn	generated	significant	remittances.	Since	the	rising	of	the	Palestinian	resistance	 in	the	aftermath	of	 the	1967	Arab	overwhelming	defeat	against	 Israel,	successive	Syrian	regimes	and	 the	Asad	one	 in	particular	 tried	 to	play	 the	Palestinian	card	 in	Lebanon	while	controlling	the	Palestinians	in	Syria,	Hāfidh	al-Asad	then	sponsored	and	created	Syrian-affiliated	Palestinian	militias.	This	strategy	led	to	a	significant	split	among	the	Palestinian	resistance	in	1983,	with	Syria	supporting	the	Fatah-Intifādhah	faction	against	the	Arafāt-led	Fatah	and	its	allied	groups	after	the	 1982	military	 defeat	 and	withdrawal	 of	 the	 PLO	 from	Beirut.	 After	 Arafāt	 relocated	 its	stronghold	 to	 Tripoli	 in	 the	 North	 of	 Lebanon,	 Syrian	 power	 managed	 to	 eradicate	 the	Palestinian	resistance	 in	 the	city	of	Tripoli	 to	regain	 the	control	over	 the	city	and	definitely	weaken	 the	 Palestinians	 in	 Lebanon.5	 In	 the	 perspective	 of	 controlling	 the	 Lebanese	 arena,	two	 years	 later,	 the	 Syrian	 army	 dispatched	 its	 troops	 to	 brutally	 repress	 against	 the	 local	Muslim	Brotherhood	group,	the	movement	of	al-Tawhīd,	in	the	suburb	of	Bāb	al-Tebbānah.	To	monitor	 the	 area	 and	 find	 a	 local	 ally,	 the	 Syrian	 regime	 armed	 and	 supported	 the	Alawite	militia	of	Eid	family	located	in	the	suburb	of	Jabal	Muhsin.	The	subsequent	rivalry	of	these	two	suburbs	of	Tripoli	 led	 to	 shoot-outs	once	 the	Syrian	army	withdrew	 from	Lebanon	 in	2005	(ICG	2010).		For	the	Shiites	population	in	Lebanon,	Syria	is	seen	as	an	ally,	as	it	started	to	rule	the	Shiite	militia	Amal	since	the	end	of	the	seventies	and,	by	the	end	of	the	war,	rewarded	the	Shiites	by	granting	Amal’s	 leader	Nabīh	Barrī	the	post	of	speaker	of	Parliament,	a	powerful	position	at	the	top	of	the	State.	With	the	Christians	on	the	contrary,	it	is	a	different	memory	of	fear	that	created	a	deep	mistrust	towards	the	Syrian	regime	and	Syrians	 in	general.	The	key	moment	can	be	identified	in	the	year	1976	when	the	Phalange	party	send	a	message	to	Hāfidh	al-Asad	asking	 for	 urgent	 military	 backup	 against	 the	 imminent	 takeover	 of	 the	 Leftists	 (National	Movement)	allied	with	the	Palestinian	resistance.	Once	the	Syrian	army	succeeded	in	halting																																																									4	As	it	is	already	apparent	with	al-Mustaqbal	(ICG	2010)	and	with	the	FSA	division	among	seculars	and	Islamists.	This	article	was	written	in	2014.	5	See	Sahlyieh	(1986).	
  
this	military	threat	by	dispatching	30,000	troops	and	began	to	meddle	in	Lebanon’s	internal	turmoil,	 it	 turned	 against	 the	 Phalange	 and	 in	 1978	 started	 to	 shelling	 the	 Christian	strongholds	of	the	neighbourhood	of	al-Ašrafiyyah	in	Beirut.	During	the	1982	Israeli	invasion,	the	 alliance	between	 the	Lebanese	Forces	 and	 the	 Israeli	Defence	Force	 (IDF)	 provided	 the	ideal	combination	some	Christians	expected	would	result	in	a	more	pro-western	Lebanon.	As	high	 hopes	 faded	 away	when	 Israel	withdrew	 to	 the	 security	 zone,	 an	 agreement	 between	militias	 under	 a	 Syrian	 patronage	 failed	 (1985)	 and	 pushed	 Syria	 to	 play	 the	 international	card	to	 impose	the	al-Tā’if	agreements	(1989)	to	all	militias	which	was	reluctantly	accepted	by	 the	Lebanese	Forces.	 In	 the	new	set-up	of	Lebanon’s	 Second	Republic,	 the	weight	of	 the	Christians	has	been	decreased	and	the	last	defender	of	Lebanon’s	sovereignty,	General	Michel	‘Awn,	the	then	head	of	the	Lebanese	Army,	went	into	exile	after	a	heavy	battle	(Picard	2002).	In	the	post-civil	war	era,	the	Syrian	tutelage	over	Lebanon	left	a	very	bad	memory	to	many	Lebanese,	 particularly	 Christians	 who	 boycotted	 the	 first	 Parliamentary	 election	 (1992).		Presented	 as	 a	 protective	 force	 against	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 militias’	 laws	 and	 the	 renewal	 of	conflict,	 the	 Syrian	 military	 presence	 persisted,	 contrary	 to	 the	 al-Tā’if	 agreements.	 The	system	put	in	place	was	a	mix	of	strategic	and	commercial	interests	for	Syria	(Salloukh,	2009).	Every	 day	 extortion	 and	 regular	 humiliation	 of	 Syrian	 secret	 services	 (mukhābarāt)	 or	soldiers	at	 check-points	 left	 a	popular	 impression	of	 facing	a	 rampant	pillage.	The	 fear	also	came	from	a	reign	of	arbitrary	violence	that	made	life	as	surrounded	by	a	system	of	unwritten	laws	monitored	by	authorities	under	 the	supervision	of	 the	Syrian	 “proconsul”,	at	 that	 time	Ġāzī	Kana’ān.		The	Syrian	military	withdrawal	led	to	an	expansion	of	violence	with	the	assassination	of	a	number	 of	 anti-Syrian	 intellectuals	 and	 politicians	 as	 if	 the	 regime	 in	 Damascus	wanted	 to	punish	 the	 Lebanese	 for	 their	 alliance	 with	 the	 US.	 The	 spread	 of	 terror	 with	 car	 bombs,	assassinations	and	explosions	that	occurred	added	to	the	grievance	against	“the	Syrians”.6	The	fear	 continued	 for	 several	 years,	 as	 every	 targeted	 assassination	 since	 then	was	blamed	on	Syria	by	many	Christian	leaders	and	also	by	some	Sunnis	because	of	its	supposed	implications	in	the	assassination	of	former	Prime	Minister	Rafīq	Harīrī	and	security	officers	conducting	the	inquiry	on	his	murder.	This	assassination	was	a	traumatic	event	for	the	Sunni	Lebanese	that	saw	their	most	powerful	symbol	erased.	 It	broke	 into	pieces	 their	political	alliance	with	 the	Syrian	regime	perceived	as	responsible	for	this	assassination.	The	latter	has	also	left	a	heavy	mark	 in	 the	 popular	 Christian	 mindset	 for	 whom	 the	 Syrian	 regime	 was	 evil.	 As	 a	consequence,	it	then	blurred	the	categories	between	occupiers	and	refugees	the	moment	they	flew	 to	 Lebanon	 in	 2011.	 This	 is	 actually	 reflected	 in	 the	 current	 trend	 among	 Christian	politicians	 –	 should	 they	 be	 8th	 or	 14th	 March	 affiliated7	 –	 who	 started	 accusing	 Syrian	refugees	 of	 being	 a	 danger	 for	 Lebanon	 at	 all	 levels	 (security,	 politics,	 economic).	 Such	reactions	are	telling	about	this	long	memory	while	those	Christian	politicians	are	supposedly	allied	to	Al-Mustaqbal,	which	support	the	Syrian	refugees	against	the	Asad	regime.		
1.2.	State’s	policy	towards	the	Syrian	and	Palestinian	refugees		Lebanon’s	 policy	 could	 be	 examined	 by	 starting	 at	 the	 edge	 of	 State,	 on	 borders	 that	 are	currently	under	 the	 spotlight	due	 to	daily	 shelling	 and	 attacks	 along	 its	 blurred	 limits	with	Syria	in	the	Biqā’	Valley.	Actually,	the	border	is	a	location	of	transition	for	men,	weapons	and																																																									6	To	the	point	of	 thousands	of	Syrian	workers	had	to	 leave	Lebanon	as	 they	 feared	the	anger	of	 the	Lebanese.	Several	 among	 those	 workers	 were	 randomly	 killed	 during	 the	 following	 years	 after	 the	 Syrian	 military	withdrawal.	7	The	two	political	camps	emerged	in	2005	after	the	two	mass	demonstrations	for	the	pro-Syrian	gathering	(Hizb	Allāh,	Amal,	Free	Patriotic	Movement,	Syrian	Social	National	Party)	the	8	March	and	for	the	anti-Syrian	coalition	(Progressive	Socialist	Party,	Lebanese	Forces,	Al-Mustaqbal,	the	Phalangist	party)	the	14	March.	
  
other	 supplies,	 slowly	 transforming	 the	 surrounding	 areas	 in	 “border	 zones,”	 as	 a	 sort	 of	redefinition	 of	 a	 space	 thanks	 to	 its	 changing	 function.	 In	 the	 past,	 people	 from	 this	 region	survived	mainly	through	contraband	and	smuggling	goods	across	this	porous	border.	Today,	this	contraband	has	transformed	in	a	new	trade:	helping	the	Free	Syrian	Army	(FSA)	and	anti–regime	fighters	that	need	support,	shelter	and	supplies.8	In	this	sense,	the	North	of	Lebanon	has	slowly	become	a	new	frontline	 for	 internal	 issues	related	to	the	security	of	borderlands	because	of	the	massive	influx	of	refugees	arriving	from	Syria	in	the	knowledge	that	a	part	of	them	are	members	of	 the	Free	Syrian	Army.9	On	29	April	2011,	several	 thousands	of	Syrian	refugees,	mainly	women	and	children,	crossed	the	Lebanese	border	in	the	North	of	Lebanon,	fleeing	repression	in	their	town	of	Talkalakh	(Balanche	2011).	From	its	inception,	this	flow	of	refugees	 was	 a	 concern	 for	 the	 Lebanese	 State	 and	 officials	 regarding	 their	 treatment	 and	their	categorization.	The	first	groups	that	arrived	found	shelter	through	kin	and	clan	help	in	local	 communities	 in	Wādī	Khālid	and	 the	 ‘Akkār	area,	and	also	 thanks	 to	UNHCR	and	High	Relief	 Commission,	 a	 Lebanese	 body	 affiliated	 to	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 tasked	 to	 deal	 with	emergency	 situations	 in	 coordination	 with	 social	 affairs,	 education	 and	 public	 health	ministries	(ICG	2013).		With	the	change	in	government	and	the	arrival	of	8	March	coalition	in	power,	the	then	new	Prime	Minister,	Najīb	Mīqātī,	 adopted	 a	 far	more	 ambiguous	 attitude	 toward	 refugees.	First,	he	remained	silent	on	 the	 issue	using	 force	 to	close	 the	border,	 trying	 to	expel	Syrian	civilians	seeking	refuge	in	Lebanon,	and	even	threatening	to	jail	several	people	and	deporting	others.	 Then,	 he	 turned	 a	 blind	 eye	 to	 the	 fate	 of	 people	 seeking	 shelter,	 labelling	 them	 as	traitors	 and	 finally	 stopping	monitoring	 the	 arrivals	 of	 refugees,	 as	 if	 authorities	wanted	 to	deny	the	problem.	During	the	summer	2012,	the	government	set	up	a	new	policy	of	neutrality	toward	what	 is	happening	 in	Syria	under	the	 label	of	 “dissociation	policy”.	Pretending	to	be	neutral,	 this	 policy	 in	 fact	 adopted	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 most	 powerful	 –	 the	 Syrian	government	–	and	was	referring	to	traditional	links	between	main	political	components	of	the	Lebanese	government	with	the	Asad	regime.	Facing	growing	arrivals	in	2012	as	the	crisis	in	Syria	 deepened,	 Mīqātī,	 still	 following	 its	 dissociation	 policy,	 tried	 to	 avoid	 any	 further	problem	in	asking	the	 ICRC	to	 label	refugees	as	“displaced	persons”	 instead	of	 “refugees”	 in	order	to	avoid	any	gathering	in	camps	or	treatment	under	refugee	international	convention.	One	can	also	notice	a	sort	of	criminalization	of	 the	refugees10	 that	 led	Mīqātī	 to	 lean	on	 the	Higher	 Relief	 Commission	 more	 than	 on	 ICRC	 in	 order	 to	 enforce	 the	 use	 of	 “displaced	persons”	as	a	 legitimate	 terminology	as	Social	Affairs	Minister	Wā’il	Abū	Fāoūr	put	 in	April	2012.	It	was	clear	regarding	the	political	affiliation	of	the	government	that	the	meddling	of	the	refugees	with	 the	Free	Syrian	Army	was	 serving	 the	purpose	of	 an	 amalgamation	of	 Syrian	refugees	as	trouble	makers	in	order	to	justify,	in	advance,	any	type	of	repression.	Finally,	by	the	end	of	2012,	the	Lebanese	government	shifted	from	a	“no	problem”	policy	to	an	“urgent	international	call”,	acknowledging	that	Lebanon	was	facing	a	massive	influx	of	Syrian	refugees	entering	and	staying	in	the	country.	This	shift	is	correlated	to	the	international	call	for	funding	launched	by	UNHCR	at	the	same	time.	After	Prime	Minister	Mīqātī’s	resignation,	at	the	end	of	March	2013,	President	Sulaymān	stated	 that	Lebanon	was	reaching	 its	 limits	 to	 take	Syrian	displaced	persons	in,	voicing,	with	other	Christian	elites	that	severe	measures	must	be	taken	against	troublemakers	among	Syrian	refugees	(Meier	2013).11	
																																																								8	Interview	with	a	journalist,	Beirut,	September	2012.	9	 The	 Lebanese	 Army	 gives	 the	 figure	 of	 a	 quarter	 of	 them	 being	members	 of	 the	 FSA.	 See	 L’Orient	 Le	 Jour,	12.10.2012.		10	See	Culture	Minister	Kābī	Layūn	statements	in	Al-Nahār,	4.4.2012.		11	As	a	consequence	of	such	statements,	some	Syrian	refugees	chose	to	go	back	to	Syria,	cf.	Magazine,	5.4.2013.	
  
UNHCR	 statistics	 indicate	 that	 between	 August	 2012	 and	 the	 end	 of	 the	 year,	 the	number	 of	 refugees	 increased	 from	 36,000	 to	 approx.	 150,000	 people.	 And	 since	 then,	 the	influx	 has	 continued	 climb	 with	 463,000	 people	 by	 9	 May	 2013	 and	 recently	 reached	1,151,057	by	2	October	2014.	One	must	note	that	such	number	is	simply	an	estimated	number	of	 Syrian	 refugees	 actually	 staying	 in	 Lebanon	 because	 some	 refugees	 refuse	 to	 register,	fearing	 for	 their	 own	 security	 as	 the	 Lebanese	 government	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 pro–Asad.	According	 to	 UNHCR’s	 last	 data	 figure	 early	 October	 2014,	 the	 majority	 of	 them	 are	 now	located	 in	 the	Biqā’	 valley	 (36%)	 and	 in	Beirut	 as	 the	 capital	 region	 is	 receiving	 a	 growing	amount	of	them	(jumping	from	18%	in	the	Spring	2013	to	27,5%	in	fall	2014).	The	North	that	was	 traditionally	 the	 hotspot	 for	 Syrian’s	 gatherings	 seem	 to	 have	 reach	 its	 peak	 (24,5%)	while	the	South	of	Lebanon	gather	a	less	important	number	(12%)	with	the	Syrians	that	are	also	 fleeing	 through	 the	Šib’ā	Farms	area.12	Such	 location	of	 refugees	can	be	explained	by	a	mix	process	of	refugee	gathering	in	closed	borderland	(North/Biqāʿ)	first	and	when	facing	a	saturation	they	tend	to	spread	and	tended	to	find	new	resources	in	town,	mainly	in	the	capital	city	since	this	last	year	(2013-2014).	The	borderlands	with	Syria,	mainly	in	the	Biqāʿ,	are	still	playing	a	key	 role	 for	historical	 reasons.	Trans	border	 links,	 like	marriages,	 trafficking,	 and	markets,	existed	prior	to	the	delimitation	of	the	“Grand	Liban”	in	1920	and	persisted	further,	as	 the	 separation	 has	 been	 seen	 as	 artificial.	 In	 addition	 it	 should	 be	 highlighted	 that	 the	central	power	in	Beirut	lacked	any	interest	for	such	areas.	Today,	the	conflict	in	Syria	incites	refugees	to	stay	close	to	their	country	but	sheltered	 inside	Lebanese	borders.	 It	 is	 the	same	thought–process	used	by	combatants	of	the	Free	Syrian	Army	and	other	anti–Asad	groups,	as	the	area	allows	for	the	setting	up	of	training	camps.	With	the	massive	presence	of	refugees,	it	is	not	a	surprise	that	the	North	of	Lebanon	became	a	sanctuary	for	anti-regime	activism,	from	where	weapons	are	smuggled	and	injured	combatants	are	tended	to.		Everything	 is	happening	as	 if	 the	main	fears	of	 the	Mīqātī	government	were	realised;	the	northern	part	 of	 the	 country	has	now	become	a	 stronghold	 for	 the	 Syrian	uprising	 and	recently	 turned	 to	be	 a	 new	 sphere	of	 influence	of	 the	 jihadis	 of	Al-Nusra	Front	 and	of	 the	Islamic	State13.	It	is	not	surprising	to	discover	that,	prominent	politicians	of	the	al-Mustaqbal	appeared	 to	 have	 sent	 money	 and	 weapons	 to	 support	 the	 anti-regime	 struggle.14	 In	 this	context,	it	is	clear	that	settling	down	Syrian	refugees	in	camps	facilitated	the	task	of	the	Syrian	uprising	 for	 the	 recruitment	 of	 combatants	 and	 supporters.	 These	 “de	 facto	 camps”	 have	emerged	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	 constant	 pressure	 from	 the	 international	 organizations	 like	 the	ICRC,	and	a	“laissez-faire”	policy	finally	adopted	by	Mīqātī’s	government	few	months	prior	his	resignation.15	More	broadly,	the	8	March	coalition	seems	to	be	also	afraid	of	another	collateral	issue	with	 camps	 provided	 for	 these	 refugees:	 their	 possible	 long-term	 stay	 in	 Lebanon.	 In	effect,	if	the	uprising	in	Syria	is	defeated	most	of	refugees	will	not	go	back	easily.	On	the	event	of	 a	 breakdown	 of	 the	 regime,	 the	 ensuing	 chaos	 that	 will	 prevail	 will	 also	 not	 be	 secure	enough	for	most	of	the	refugees	to	go	back	quickly	(ICG	2012).	In	December	2012	a	new	issue	appeared	for	Lebanon	as	a	consequence	of	the	Syrian	war:	 the	 entering	 of	 thousands	 of	 Palestinian	 refugees	 in	 Lebanon	 after	 the	 fall	 of	 Yarmūk	camp	 in	 Damascus.	 This	 new	 influx	 of	 refugees	 occurred	 after	 a	 fierce	 battle	 during	which	Free	Syrian	Army	and	Islamists	took	over	from	Syrian	security	forces	and	the	Popular	Front	for	 the	Liberation	of	Palestine-General	Command	 (PFLP-GC).16	 It	was	a	major	 turning	point	for	 Palestinians	 in	 Syria	 and	 it	 undermined	 their	 cautious	 neutral	 position	 in	 the	 current																																																									12	See	UNHCR	website’s	data	at:	<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>.		13	Regarding	the	clashes	that	erupted	early	August	2014	see	The	Daily	Star,	3.08.14.	14	For	a	different	perspective	on	this	issue	see	the	paper	of	Lorenzo	Trombetta	in	this	special	issue.	15	Interviews	with	ICRC	Head	of	Mission	in	Beirut,	September	2012	and	April	2013.	16	Al-Akhbār,	17.12.2012.	
  
conflict,	after	the	departure	of	the	Hamas	leadership	from	Damascus	during	the	Spring	2012.	The	positioning	of	Hamas	regarding	the	Syrian	uprising	and	the	internal	divisions	of	the	PFLP-GC	that	occurred	with	the	fall	of	Yarmūk	camp,	are	potential	issues	that	Palestinian	refugees	are	bringing	into	Lebanon.	Clashes	in	the	‘Ayn	al-Hilwah	camp	between	Islamist	partisans	of	the	Al-Nusrah	Front,	which	emerged	in	the	Syrian	battleground,	and	the	pro-Baššār	PFLP-GC	and	the	al-Sā’iqah	headquarters17	have	set	an	alarm	among	the	several	factions	of	the	camp.	Afraid	 of	 any	 renewal	 of	 Nahr	 al-Barīd	 scenario	 (destruction	 of	 the	 camp	 by	 the	 Lebanese	Army),	these	local	factions	have	dealt	with	that	issue	and	recently	set	up	a	unified	command	structure	in	a	trouble	camp	like	‘Ayn	al-Hilwah	in	order	to	avoid	anymore	violent	incidents	or	troubles	outside	camps	that	could	result	in	Lebanese	army	intervention.18		For	Lebanon,	to	see	Palestinian	refugees	arriving	in	such	number	unveiled	old	demons	linked	to	the	civil	war	and	the	divisions	among	Lebanese	they	provoked.	This	fear	is	palpable	among	Christians	who	have	bad	memories	of	 the	PLO	setting	up	 in	Lebanon	and	starting	to	enrol	Palestinian	refugees	transforming	in	the	process	the	refugee	camps	in	military	training	areas	 and	 ruling	 some	 parts	 of	 the	 national	 territory	 in	 complete	 autonomy.19	 Moreover,	Christian	fears	are	embedded	in	the	numerous	and	fierce	battles	they	had	with	the	Palestinian	
fidā’īyyin	 –	 who	 had	 originally	 arrived	 as	 refugees	 in	 1948	 and	 who	 were	 allied	 to	 the	predominantly	Muslim	rival	Lebanese	groups	gathered	in	the	National	Movement.	The	loss	of	power	for	the	Christians	of	Lebanon	by	the	end	of	the	civil	war	when	Damascus	took	the	lead	over	the	country	have	often	been	described	as	the	consequence	of	the	Palestinian	presence	in	Lebanon	(al-Khazen,	2001).	Nowadays,	the	main	tensions	can	arise	less	from	“terrorist	cells”	hidden	in	the	camps	but	more	from	the	living	conditions	the	“Syrian”	Palestinian	refugees	are	facing,	as	they	gather	in	overcrowded	spaces	in	Saydā	and	Tyre’s	camps.	In	the	meantime,	a	recent	UNRWA’s	inquiry	showed	first	that	some	of	them	chose	to	return	to	Syria	as	their	living	conditions	 in	 Lebanon	 really	 worsened	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 their	 number	 slightly	decreased.20	And	second,	a	process	of	emigration	is	now	taking	place	and	echoes	the	closing	of	the	Lebanese	border	for	Palestinians	from	Syria	since	May	2014	(Meier,	2014).			
2.	The	threat	of	a	sectarian	confrontation	Sunnis–Shiites		The	 “Arab	 Spring”,	 wrote	 Hicham	 Ben	 Abdallah	 El-Alaoui	 in	 Le	 Monde	 diplomatique,	 is	 a	process	 that	 is	 experiencing	 a	 larger	 strife	 between	 Sunnis	 and	 Shiites	 across	 several	countries	 of	 the	Middle	 East.	 And	 a	 Shiite	 axis	 (Iran,	 Syria,	 and	 Hizb	 Allāh)	 seems	 to	 have	provoked	an	objective	alliance	between	USA,	Saudi	Arabia,	Israel,	and	Turkey	in	order	to	limit	its	scope	of	influence	(El-Alaoui	2013).	Although	one	may	not	want	to	agree	with	this	cultural	reading,	it	is	fact	that	Lebanon	looks	as	if	it	embodies	all	the	contradictions	of	the	region	and	also	the	tensions	among	enemies.21	The	second	year	of	the	Syrian	uprising	created	more	side	effects	 in	Lebanon	as	 the	 initial	hope	of	a	quick	 resolution	of	 the	crisis	 faded	away.	Several	clashes	in	Tripoli	in	2012	and	a	slow	erosion	of	power	of	the	two	parties	-	al-Mustaqbal	and																																																									17	See	Al-Akhbār	english,	4.2.2013.	18	The	memory	of	the	destruction	of	Nahr	el-Bared	camp	near	Tripoli	in	2007	–	when	a	jihadi-led	group	Fatah	al-Islam	took	position	in	the	camp	after	killing	dozens	of	Lebanese	soldiers	and	the	Lebanese	Army	besieged	and	shelled	the	camp	during	three	month	–	is	still	working	as	a	collective	nightmare.	Interview	with	a	leading	figure	of	the	Democratic	Front	for	Liberation	of	Palestine	(DFLP),	April	2013.	19	That’s	one	of	the	heavy	memory	of	the	“Fathaland”	that	goes	along	with	the	common	fear	often	heard	about	the	“extra-judicial”	spaces	that	Palestinian	camps	would	be.	20	From	the	initial	figure	of	70,000	refugees	at	least,	UNRWA	last	door-to-door	inquiry	showed	a	figure	of	42,000	Palestinian	refugees	from	Syria.	See	Monthly Briefing, Issue 37, 31 July 2014	21	 For	 a	 reading	 of	 the	 Sunnis/Shia	 confrontation	 in	 Lebanon	 and	 in	 the	 regional	 context	 see	 Di	 Peri	 in	 this	special	issue.	
  
Hizb	Allāh	 -	 have	 driven	 the	 country	 on	 a	 dangerous	 path	 of	 private	 violence	 (with	 the	 al-Miqdād	 episode	 last	 summer	 and	 the	 Šaykh	 Asīr	 phenomenon	 in	 Saydā	 as	 detailed	 below)	within	 the	wider	 turmoil.	 These	 two	political	movements	 saw	 their	 interests	 in	 a	 sectarian	interpretation	of	 the	 Syrian	 conflict	 between	 the	Alawite	power	 and	 the	opposed	Sunni-led	armed	groups.	They	have	imported	it	as	a	general	framework	shaping	the	older	Sunnis-Shiites	tension	that	found	its	basement	in	the	political	opposition	8/14	March.	Actors	between	these	two	 political	 blocks	 are	 using	 this	 sectarian	 opposition	 to	 reinforce	 their	 discourse	 and	position	at	the	risk	of	provoking	escalations	that	could	get	out	of	control.		
2.1.	Dangerous	Games:	al-Mustaqbal	and	Hizb	Allāh’s	Strategies		 The	 sectarian	 dimension	 that	 has	 arisen	 is	 the	 by–product	 of	 a	 legacy	 of	 previous	tensions	and	frustrations	and	a	dangerous	strategy	followed	by	the	two	political	parties	that	have	tried	to	gather	the	Sunnis	in	al-Mustaqbal	–	the	Harīrī–led	party,	and	the	Shiites	in	Hizb	Allāh	–	a	clearly	religious	oriented	party.	Nevertheless,	both	of	them	are	claiming	a	nationalist	orientation	and	both	are	providing	with	a	“national”	vision	for	Lebanon.	Among	some	Sunnis	affiliated	with	 al-Mustaqbal,	 a	 legacy	 of	 powerlessness	 have	 crystallized	 in	 a	 belief	 of	 their	political	marginalization	 that	 started	with	 the	 assassination	 of	 former	Prime	minister	Rafīq	 arīrī	 followed	by	 the	return	of	a	Syrian	 imperium	on	Lebanon	through	Hizb	Allāh’s.22	This	was	 illustrated	 by	 weaponry	 demonstrations	 during	 the	 2006	 July	 war	 against	 Israel	 and,	even	more	so,	 the	 takeover	of	West	Beirut	 in	May	2008	when	Hizb	Allāh	 launched	a	 “coup”	over	the	capital	in	order	to	obtain	militarily	a	political	decision	that	the	party	of	God	was	not	able	 to	 win	 by	 other	 means.	 This	 explanation	 of	 what	 happened	 is,	 of	 course,	 partial	 but	translates	a	major	 fear	against	a	Shiite	axis	and	a	 feeling	of	disregard	 for	Sunnis’	pride	and	interests.	From	 this	point–of–view,	 there	has	been	a	 reading	of	 the	 “Sunni	 struggle”	against	Hizb	Allāh	as	a	mirror	of	the	struggle	of	the	Syrian	uprising	against	the	regime	of	Baššār	al-Asad.		 On	the	other	side,	Hizb	Allāh’s	sectarian	perception	of	the	refugee	issue	is	related	to	a	security	dilemma.	Facing	a	massive	influx	of	Syrians,	most	of	them	from	Sunni	confession,	the	policy	of	Hizb	Allāh	was	to	see	the	problem	as	both	humanitarian	(and	the	party	provided	aid)	and	political,	when	humanitarian	intervention	is	used	to	boost	support	 for	 insurgents.	More	revealing,	 several	 cadres	 of	 God’s	 Party	 tended	 to	 reveal	 a	 narrow	 mind-set,	 fearing	 the	formation	 of	 an	 internal	 enemy	 and	 so	 nurturing	 sectarian	 tensions	 (ICG,	 2013).	 In	 the	meantime,	 they	didn’t	 seem	to	understand	 that	Hizb	Allāh’s	 involvement	 in	Syria	with	Asad	regime	rendered	almost	impossible	a	non-reaction	from	Syrian	refugees	who	are	sympathetic	to	 the	 insurgents.	But	 the	main	problem	 is	purely	political	 as	 statements	 and	 threat	of	 FSA	towards	 izb	Allāh	showed	(although	in	return	Hizb	Allāh	tends	to	undermine	insurgents	in	labelling	 them	 as	 takfīrīs).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 Syrian	 uprising	 is	 bolstering	 this	 sectarian	perception	 of	 a	 broader	 struggle	 across	 the	 Middle	 East	 where	 Sunnis	 confronts	 Shiites	providing	confidence	to	Sunni	Islamists	to	settle	old	scores.		More	concretely,	as	noted	by	the	ICG	(2012),	 the	conflict	 in	Syria	allowed	all	 Islamist	groups	to	bolster	their	standing	and	reconnect	with	a	sectarian	selective	memory.	This	means	a	systematic	sectarian	reading	of	every	event	that	affects	any	Sunni	militants	as	in	May	2012	when	 riots	 started	 after	 a	 Lebanese	 Salafi	 anti–Syrian	was	 arrested	 for	 its	 implication	 in	 a		
Jihādi	“terrorist	groups.”23	It	is	the	same	feeling	that	spread	across	the	community	when	two	Sunnis	clerics	were	killed	at	a	military	check-point	in	North	Lebanon	and	when	a	prominent																																																									22	And	this	representation	of	Hizb	Allāh	as	the	main	enemy	of	the	Sunnis	became	stronger	after	the	indictment	of	four	members	of	the	God’s	party	by	the	Special	Tribunal	for	Lebanon	in	June	2011.	23	See	Mawlawi’s	arrest	in	Tripoli	on	www.naharnet.com	12.5.2012.	
  
Sunni	 figure	within	 the	Lebanese	security	apparatus,	Wissām	Al-Hasan,	was	assassinated	 in	al-Ašrafiyyah	 in	 October	 2012.	 The	 rage	 in	 the	 streets	 of	 Beirut	 the	 following	 day	was	 the	result	of	sectarian	mobilization.	It	also	showed	the	dangerous	game	al-Mustaqbal	leaders	have	been	playing	and	the	price	they	paid	that	day	 in	being	unable	to	mobilize	peacefully.	 In	this	context,	the	poor	number	of	people	al-Mustaqbal	succeeded	to	mobilize	for	a	demonstration	against	 Mīqātī	 just	 after	Wissām	 al-Hasan’s	 assassination	 is	 revealing	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 political	vision.	Both	examples	showed	an	erosion	of	the	legitimacy	of	political	leaders	and	among	al-Mustaqbal	the	continuation	of	a	process	of	implosion	(ICG,	2010a),	aggravated	by	the	flight	of	the	party’s	leading	figure,	Sa’ad	Harīrī,	to	Paris	for	security	reasons	for	over	a	year.	In	 December	 2012,	 the	 support	 of	 one	 MP	 of	 al-Mustaqbal	 rose	 sectarianism	 as	accusation	 and	 counter-accusation	 spreaded	 in	 the	 newspapers.	 Similarly,	 Hizb	 Allāh	 was	accused	in	October	2012	to	have	send	combatants	in	Syria	to	take	side	with	the	Syrian	regime	against	the	Free	Syrian	Army.24	During	the	Spring	2013,	anti-regime	sources	said	the	party	of	God	has	dispatch	several	combatants	in	the	surroundings	of	the	village	of	Qusayr	in	order	to	take	 this	 FSA	 stronghold	 to	 secure	 a	 road	 between	  im 	 and	 the	 Alawite	 region	 under	Baššār’s	 Army	 and	 the	Hizb	Allāh-led	Biqā’-Hirmil	 region.25	 This	 involvement	 of	Hizb	Allāh	with	 the	 Asad	 regime	was	 then	 confirmed	 by	Hasan	Nasrallāh	 himself	 in	 his	 25	May	 2013	speech	 and	 the	 battle	 of	 Qusayr	 that	 ensued	 brought	 Asad	 regime	 a	 major	 victory.	 Both	examples	show	how	the	tension	among	sects	can	be	used	to	justify	action,	mobilize	a	group,	and	define	what	 is	 right	and	wrong.	They	both	 illustrated	 the	danger	 for	Lebanese	political	actors	to	take	side	in	the	Syrian	crisis	at	the	risk	of	dragging	Lebanon	into	the	Syrian	conflict	or	importing	its	main	dynamics	in	Lebanon.	For	 its	 part,	 Hizb	 Allāh’s	 strategy	 regarding	 the	 current	 crisis	 in	 Syria	 relies	 on	 a	strategic	partnership	with	the	Syrian	leadership	since	the	experience	of	2006	July	war	when	Damascus	helped	and	supported	the	party	of	God.	More	significantly,	Syria	is	historically	the	strategic	depth	for	Hizb	Allāh,	the	country	through	which	its	role	as	the	Resistance	against	the	Israeli	 threat	has	been	entrenched	 in	 the	post–civil	war	 era.	 In	 such	 condition	of	 existence,	Hizb	Allāh	never	felt	that	another	sustainable	alternative	to	its	support	of	the	Syrian	regime	would	 have	 existed.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 its	 perception	 of	 the	 Syrian	 conflict	 is	 by	 large	disconnected	with	 the	 Syrian	 daily	 reality,	 as	 Hizb	 Allāh	 never	 fostered	 a	 deep	 and	 strong	relationships	with	 any	 segment	 of	 the	 Syrian	 society,	 and	 always	 dealt	with	 the	 regime	 on	political	 and	 strategic	matters	 (ICG,	 2012).	 In	 Lebanon,	Hizb	Allāh	 sees	 itself	 as	 a	 powerful	group	with	high	self–confidence	regarding	its	leadership	on	the	political	stage	and	its	role	in	maintaining	 the	 Mīqātī	 government.	 This	 has	 some	 effects	 in	 the	 prolonged	 Syrian	 crisis	environment:	 it	 seems	 to	 reinforce	 the	 attraction	 the	 party	 can	 have	 towards	 its	constituencies.	 In	effect,	 as	mentioned	by	 ICG	 (2013)	one	 side	effect	of	 the	 tensed	situation	with	car	bombed	in	the	Hizb	Allāh	stronghold	in	Beirut	is	the	reinforcement	of	the	sectarian	belonging	as	 the	Shiites	 see	 themselves	as	vulnerable	 in	 the	midst	of	 the	 current	Sunni–led	turmoil	of	the	Syrian	uprising.	Since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 turmoil	 in	 Syria,	 Hizb	 Allāh	 kept	 its	 alliance	 with	 the	 Syrian	regime.	 On	 the	 internal	 political	 stage,	 its	 alliances	 with	 Michel	 ‘Awn’s	 Free	 Patriotic	Movement	and	Nabīh	Barrī’s	Amal	movement	set	the	core	system	of	8	March	coalition	around	the	main	interest	of	preserving	Lebanon’s	stability.	Various	reasons	why	Hizb	Allāh	wants	to	keep	 this	 stability	 can	be	 listed.	First,	 it	maintains	a	military	 status	quo	with	 Israel.	 Second,	this	stability	avoids	major	clash	between	Sunnis	and	Shiites26.	Third,	the	stability	is	provided																																																									24	 In	 its	 last	 inquiry,	 ICG	 (2012:	 19)	 stated	 that,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 December	 2012,	Hizb	Allāh	 had	 a	minor	involvement	in	the	Syrian	conflict.	25	See	L’Orient	Le	Jour,	24.4.2013.	26	The	party	of	God	used	the	American	ideological	movie	“The	Innocence	of	Muslims”	to	appear	as	a	gathering	figure	crossing	the	sectarian	differences.	See	al-Safir,	18.09.2012.	
  
through	 the	 containment	 of	 the	 14	March	 opponents,	 continuing	 to	 refuse	 any	 erection	 of	camps	for	the	Syrian	refugees	and	in	the	meantime	supporting	them	with	help	and	care	and	dissociating	the	political	dimension	of	the	crisis	from	its	humanitarian	aspects.27	Fourth,	Hizb	Allāh	 did	 make	 some	 concessions	 to	 support	 Mīqātī’s	 “dissociation	 policy,”	 and	 after	 its	resignation,	 support	 the	 election	 of	 a	 moderate	 Sunni	 leader,	 Tammām	 Salām,	 in	 order	 to	release	 the	political	 tension.	 In	 the	meantime,	 the	nine-month	period	 that	was	necessary	 to	form	 the	new	government	 is	partly	due	 to	Hizb	Allāh	 intransigence	and	 is	 telling	about	 the	dangerous	 game	 the	 party	 is	 ready	 to	 play	 regarding	 the	 internal	 stability	 for	 the	 profit	 of	keeping	its	influence	on	the	main	Lebanese	political	orientations.		
2.2.	The	Raising	of	Entrepreneurship	of	Violence	
	A	major	concern	that	slowly	appeared	during	2012	is	the	lack	of	capacity	of	control	that	main	political	 actors	 seem	 to	 have	 on	 their	 respective	 constituencies.	 Several	 salient	 problems	raised	 that	question	during	 the	years	2012	and	2013	and	 should	warn	any	observer	of	 the	region	about	the	rising	power	of	entrepreneurship	of	violence.	The	eroding	legitimacy	of	al-Mustaqbal	is	due	a	lack	leadership	that	became	apparent	after	the	killing	of	Wissām	Al-Hasan	and	due	 to	 the	conflicting	 interests	within	 the	party	on	a	 range	 issues	 -	 the	role	of	 Islam	 in	politics,	the	alliance	with	the	US,	and	the	attitude	toward	the	Shiites	in	Lebanon.	In	the	case	of	Hizb	 Allāh,	 the	 Al-Miqdād	 coup	 during	 the	 summer	 2012	 when	 they	 kidnapping	 Syrians	refugees	and	workers	was	a	sign	among	other	of	the	erosion	of	its	influence.	Other	unfolded	trafficking,	corruption,	and	privileges	of	some	relatives	of	Hizb	Allāh’s	 leaders	have	crippled	the	image	of	strong	morality	of	the	party	of	God	and	reduce	its	influence	on	people’s	lives.	The	Al-Miqdād	militiamen	were	part	of	a	powerful	Shi’i	clan	(of	several	 thousands	of	people	 spread	 all	 around	 the	 country)	 originating	 from	 the	Biqā’	 Valley	 and	 known	 for	 the	connections	in	Beirut	southern	suburb	where	they	are	strong	property	developers	since	the	1950s.	The	kidnapping	they	organized	of	almost	50	Syrian	refugees	supposedly	linked	to	the	Free	Syrian	Army	and	one	Turk	sheds	a	crude	light	on	the	political	scene	during	the	summer	2012.	Their	justification	for	such	a	mass	kidnapping	was	simple:	one	of	their	relatives	had	just	been	 captured	 in	 Syria,	 presumably	by	 the	FSA.	 In	 effect,	 none	 among	 the	 State	 or	political	actors	seemed	to	be	able	either	to	free	the	Al-Miqdād	relative	in	Syria	or	dismantle	the	“armed	branch”	of	the	Al-Miqdād	clan	in	order	to	free	the	kidnapped	people.28	During	this	crisis,	Hizb	Allāh	kept	a	strange	silence	although	all	 the	kidnappings	and	Al-Miqdād’s	press	conferences	took	 place	 in	 Beirut’s	 southern	 suburb,	 one	 of	 the	 strongholds	 of	 the	 party.	 At	 first	 sight	“manipulation”	was	seen	as	congruent	hypothesis	as	 the	party	would	benefit	 from	pressure	on	anti-Syrian	regime	actors	in	Lebanon	and	also	on	members	of	the	FSA	entering	as	refugees	in	 Lebanon.	 And	 of	 course,	 Hizb	 Allāh	 was	 supposed	 to	 be	 the	 key	 actor	 to	 unlock	 that	situation	and	so	it	appeared	as	an	influent	mediator	in	such	crisis	instead	of	being	identified	as	the	taking	side	for	the	Syrian	regime.		 In	 fact,	 the	 way	 things	 turn	 later	 on	 that	 summer	 and	 the	 fact	 that,	 instead	 of	intervening	with	 their	 own	 people,	 Hizb	 Allāh	 let	 the	 Internal	 Security	 Forces	 (ISF)	 troops	take	 over	 the	 area	 and	 capture	 the	 Al-Miqdād	 kidnappers,	 suggests	 another	 explanation:	 a	weakness	or	incapacity	to	intervene	to	solve	the	problem.	The	explanation	refers	less	to	a	lack	of	 force	 but	 probably	more	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 legitimacy,	 raising	 the	 question	 of	 the	 disturbance	capacity	that	a	Shiite	clan	can	have.	In	fact	Hizb	Allāh	would	avoid	any	direct	confrontation	as	this	10,000	clan’s	members	have	a	 social	 and	political	weight	 that	no-one	can	 ignore	 (Harb	and	Deeb	2012).	What	happened	can	be	analysed	as	a	 form	of	 “autonomization”	among	 the																																																									27	See	Daily	Star,	1.10.2012.	28	See	Le	Monde,	16.08.12.	
  
Shiites	 towards	 the	 leadership	 of	 Hizb	 Allāh	 within	 its	 own	 stronghold.	 As	 the	 Al-Miqdād	deployed	 in	 arms,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 new	 step	 in	 the	 dereliction	 of	 security	 control	 over	Lebanese	territory—as	 it	 is	also	the	case	elsewhere	 in	some	areas	of	 the	country	 like	 in	the	Biqā’	Valley.	There,	 private	 vengeance	 groups	 acting	 like	outlaws	 and	 the	 rise	of	 a	 criminal	market	of	hostages	led	to	a	process	of	disenfranchisement	of	the	sovereignty	of	the	State	over	Lebanon’s	territory.	The	ISF	intervention	against	the	Al-Miqdād	clan	put	a	temporary	end	to	this	anarchy	in	the	 southern	 suburb.	 However	 the	 ripples	 and	 long	 standing	 effects	 in	 the	mind	 of	 people	regarding	the	way	things	can	be	done	remain;	it	seems	now	possible	for	other	groups,	clans,	and	families	to	seek	their	own	justice	if	parties,	leaders	and	the	State	are	not	powerful	enough	to	 do	 the	 job.	 This	 scenario	 could	 be	 read	 as	 following	 the	 “de-sectorization”	 process	illustrated	by	the	French	sociologist	Michel	Dobry	(1986)	who	tended	to	describe	a	stage	of	growing	 insecurity,	 called	 “political	 fluidity”	 (fluidité	 politique)	 where	 the	 disconnection	among	sectors	of	the	society	reduce	the	predictability	of	every	day	security.	In	Lebanon,	the	lack	of	power	of	the	State	is	not	really	new	but	what	seems	to	have	masked	it	was	the	power	of	post–militia	parties	during	 the	post-civil	war	era.	The	erosion	of	 their	capacity	of	control	tends	to	reveal	a	far	more	chaotic	security	scene	and	as	a	consequence,	a	fragmentation	of	the	national	 territory	 well	 understood	 by	 the	 Lebanese	 Army	 as	 they	 divided	 the	 country	 in	regions	of	different	level	of	importance	to	tighten	their	control.29		 On	 the	 side	 of	 the	 14	 March	 coalition,	 the	 landscape	 seems	 more	 worrying.	 The	phenomenon	 of	militiamen	 popping	 in	 the	 cities	 and	 provoking	 significant	 clashes	 like	 the	ones	 in	 Tripoli	 seems	 to	 have	 expanded	 to	 Saydā	 with	 the	 protest	 movement	 initiated	 by	Šaykh	 Asīr	 and	 its	 possible	 militarization.	 One	 can	 explain	 the	 appearance	 of	 Asīr	 protest	movement	at	the	junction	of	a	pauperization	process	of	the	city	(and	the	lack	of	investments)	and	of	an	indirect	effect	of	Hizb	Allāh’s	weapons	creating	a	deep	frustration	based	on	a	feeling	of	 powerlessness	 that	 has	 spread	 among	 the	 Sunni	 community.30	 This	 constitutes	 a	 fertile	ground	 for	 mobilization	 and	 for	 the	 acquisition	 of	 weaponry	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 a	 power	 of	deterrence	more	than	a	capacity	to	confront	Hizb	Allāh	(ICG,	2012).	On	a	regular	basis	since	last	 summer	 2012,	 Šaykh	Asīr	 tried	 to	 import	 this	way	 of	 reading	 the	 reality	 in	 Beirut	 but	failed	 to	mobilize	 Sunnis,	 although	 he	 threatened	 to	 set	 up	 a	militia	 after	 a	 fight	with	Hizb	Allāh’s	militants	 that	 led	 to	 the	death	of	 several	partisans	of	 the	 Šaykh.31	More	 recently,	 he	made	new	attempts	in	the	North	of	Lebanon32	when	dead	bodies	of	Lebanese	fighters	killed	by	 the	 Syrian	 regime	were	 repatriated,	 but	 it	 didn’t	 seem	 to	 have	been	 a	 successful,	 as	 the	local	 scene	 sees	 the	 presence	 of	 several	 actors	 that	monopolize	 the	 political	 scene.	 After	 a	process	of	militarization	 including	public	 call	 for	military	 involvement	of	 Sunnis	 volunteers	for	 the	 jihad	 in	Syria	against	 the	Asad	 regime,	 Šaykh	Asīr	did	a	military	 coup	 in	 controlling	Said	for	few	hours	with	its	militiamen	by	mid-June	2013.	This	finally	ended	with	a	major	clash	with	the	Lebanese	army	that	besieged	the	Šaykh	and	his	partisans	in	the	Mosque	of	Abra,	near	Saydā.	 Three	 days	 of	 combats	 put	 an	 end	 to	 its	 movement	 although	 the	 Šaykh	 himself	vanished	into	thin	air	during	the	fight33.	In	 Tripoli,	 constant	 eruptions	 of	 violence	 (an	 average	 of	 four	 per	 year	 since	 2005	generating	 dozens	 of	 deaths	 each	 time)	 have	 dragged	 the	 capital	 of	 North	 Lebanon	 into	 a	security	vacuum.	In	spite	of	such	a	situation	and	regular	“security	plans”	set	up	by	the	Interior																																																									29	 This	 strategy	 puts	Mont	 Lebanon/Beirut	 area	 as	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 national	 safety	 device.	 Interview	with	 an	anonymous	informant,	Beirut,	June	2013.	30	Interview	with	Ahmad	Baydūn,	Beirut,	December	2012.	31	See	L’Orient	Le	Jour,	17.11.2012.		32	See	Daily	Star,	16.12.2012.		33	See	L’Orient	le	Jour,	23.06.2013.	
  
Security	 Forces	 (ISF)	 the	 entrepreneurships	 of	 violence	have	 gain	 a	 form	of	 autonomy	 that	finally	 alarmed	 the	 14	March	 coalition	 and	 al-Mustaqbal	 in	 particular,	 considering	 the	 fact	those	militiamen	are	defined	as	close	 to	14	March.	With	small	groups	of	anti-Syrian	regime	Salafis,	 the	 suburb	 of	 Bāb	 al–Tabbānah	 seems	 to	 have	 developed	 small	 companies	 that	 are	selling	 their	 militia	 power	 to	 other	 actors,	 like	 the	 Gulf	 monarchies,	 that	 sponsored	 other	similar	actors	in	Syria	or	Iraq34.	Broader	interests	seem	then	to	lay	behind	the	fight	between	Bāb	 al–Tabbānah	 and	 its	 counterpart	 the	Alawite	 Jabal	Muhsan	 suburb	 and	deepen	 the	 rift	among	 the	 two	 sects	 that	both	 claim	 to	be	besieged	by	 the	other	 group	against	whom	only	force	can	be	the	way	to	affirm	their	own	identity.35	One	of	the	most	worrying	aspects	of	this	privatization	 of	 war	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	 former	 professional	 of	 the	 Army	 who	 decided	 to	recruit	 combatants	 like	 former	 Col.	 Hammūd,	 to	 set	 up	 a	 Sunni	 militia.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Hammūd’s	militia,	as	reported	by	al-Akbār	newspaper,	he	trained	and	sent	fighters	on	several	frontlines,	in	Tripoli	as	well	as	in	Syria	and	then	succeeded	in	relocating	its	activity	with	rank	and	 files	 in	 the	 Beiruti	 Sunni	 stronghold	 of	 al-Tarīq	 al-Jadīdah	 without	 being	 arrested	 or	accused.36		 	
3.	Conclusion		It	 seems	 undoubted	 that	 the	 refugee	 issue	will	 have	 consequences	 on	 the	 current	 internal	situation	in	Lebanon.	As	we	have	seen	in	this	article,	the	massive	presence	of	Syrian	refugees	together	with	the	arrival	of	thousands	of	Palestinian	refugees	provoke	fear,	tensions	and	are	stirring	off	a	controversy	about	the	attitude	the	Lebanese	State	should	adopt	facing	the	crisis	in	Syria.	 It	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 the	Hizb	Allāh’s	 statements	made	 late	May	2013	confirming	 its	military	involvement	with	the	Asad	regime	have	generated	major	security	issues	with	several	car	bombs	exploding	 in	 the	Beirut	 southern	suburb	and	other	explosions	 targeting	 the	Shi’i	community	elsewhere	in	the	country,	all	claimed	by	Sunnis	jihadists	probably	linked	to	Syrian	groups	 close	 to	 al-Qaida.	 The	 escalation	 of	 clashes	 in	 the	 capital	 of	 the	 North,	 Tripoli,	 the	moment	al-Qusayr	just	fell	and	the	violence	of	the	round	of	the	battle	between	the	two	rival	suburbs	 that	 followed	 gave	 a	 dark	 picture	 of	 a	 possible	 spill-over	 generated	 by	 the	confrontation	in	Syria	and	its	importation	in	Lebanon	thanks	to	al-Mustaqbal	and	Hizb	Allāh.	The	new	Prime	Minister	Tammām	Salām	doesn’t	seem	able	to	change	anything	towards	these	powerful	actors.	More	problematic	is	the	possibility	that	not	even	traditional	sectarian	leaders	would	be	in	a	position	to	stop	provocations	and	riots	to	erupt	from	time	to	time.	This	can	be	explained	through	the	massive	presence	of	new	Syrian	with	some	foreign	actors,	not	clearly	identified,	 probably	 linked	 to	 the	 Islamist	 complex	 web.37	 If	 some	 analysts	 predict	 the	continuation	 of	 such	 slow	 motion	 unrest	 with	 occasional	 irruption	 of	 violence,38	 others,	outside	 Lebanon,	 underline	 the	 strong	 effects	 that	 a	 change	 in	 Syria	 could	 produce	 in	Lebanon.39	But	one	hypothesis	has	to	be	explored	further:	the	continuation	of	a	status	quo	in	Syria	and	in	Lebanon	as	well.	These	concluding	remarks	would	lay	on	this	highly	probabilistic	scenario.		 As	seen	in	this	article,	there	are	several	vectors	of	importation	of	the	Syrian	crisis	and	war	 spill	 over	 in	 Lebanon.	 Apart	 the	 direct	 implication	 of	 Syrian	 officers	 in	 destabilizing	Lebanon	–	a	scenario	that	even	Hizb	Allāh	wouldn’t	approve	of	because	Lebanon’s	stability	is																																																									34	Al-A bār,	24.10.12.	35	Ibidem.	36	Ibidem.	37	During	the	summer	2014,	several	Jihadists	from	different	countries	have	been	arrested	in	Beirut.	38	As	stated	by	A mād	Beydūn,	interviewed	in	Beirut,	December	2012.	39	See	for	instance	Berthelot	(2012).	
  
actually	a	pillar	of	its	strategy	–	both	8/14	March	political	forces	are	using	the	Syrian	turmoil	for	their	own	purposes	in	order	to	mobilize	or	affirm	a	strong	position.	Another	danger	seems	that	 in	using	 categories	 and	dichotomies	 that	 result	 from	 the	battlefront	 such	 as	 Sunnis	 vs.	Shi’ites,	 terrorists	 vs.	 government,	 people	 vs.	 oppressors	 the	 type	 of	 mobilization	 created	among	Lebanese	could	spread	within	the	society	and	becoming	a	new	matrix	of	perception	of	the	 other	 and	 defined	 it	 as	 an	 enemy.40	 At	 some	 point,	 this	 could	 ease	 the	 task	 of	entrepreneurships	of	violence	 to	enrol	new	militants	with	 radical	messages	and	so	 simplify	the	use	of	violence.	Unfortunately,	the	political	divisions	in	Lebanon	are	sending	messages	of	discord,	even	within	the	two	antagonistic	coalitions,	revealing	a	fragmentation	process	where	every	little	event	could	degenerate	in	less	controllable	confrontations.		
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